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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PESHAWAR 000360

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SUBJECT: CORPS COMMANDER AND NWFP GOVERNOR ON FATA ISSUES

REF: (A) PESHAWAR 311 (B) PESHAWAR 255

CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Spangler, Principal Officer, AmConsul  
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REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

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Summary  
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¶1. (C) On July 10, 11th Corps Commander Lt. General Hamid Khan told the Ambassador the Pakistan Army will maintain its involvement in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) development, chiefly due to the Governor's lack of civilian capacity. The Army is the only entity with a comprehensive presence in the FATA and therefore the only one capable of executing projects in all seven agencies. The Army must also play a role in development because it wields the stick but needs carrots to win hearts and minds. Khan noted that the situation in North and South Waziristan has calmed down, but he will not participate in negotiations with the militants unless they accede to his demands. Both he and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor Ali Jan Orakzai hope the current truce with militants will lead to a political settlement that effectively denies sanctuaries to militants and stops cross-border incursions. Both (1) agreed that military force alone cannot address the insurgency and (2) called for more coordination to link civilian and military authorities on both sides of the Durand line. End Summary.

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Corps Commander  
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¶2. (C) In a July 10 conversation with the Ambassador, 11th Corps Commander Lt. General Hamid Khan confirmed his intention to maintain a significant role for the Army in FATA development programs. In reference to Governor Orakzai, a former 11th Corps Commander, he noted, "All individuals think they can turn things around, it's human nature." But Khan criticized the FATA Secretariat's capabilities, and explained that the Army is the

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only entity with the resources and capabilities to implement development projects throughout the FATA. Civilian institutions lack the capacity, and "just because the Governor has changed, doesn't mean capacity improves automatically."

¶3. (C) The Army must play a development role in the FATA, according to Khan, because it wields the stick -- and needs to offer carrots to maintain its effectiveness. The Army has to

"reward" those helping it, offering incentives as well as punishment. Furthermore, the Army has control over a wide area of the FATA and knows the terrain. It is the only institution executing projects throughout the seven agencies of the FATA, and is already providing transportation and protection to civilian institutions.

¶4. (C) General Khan opined that North and South Waziristan are quiet at the present time. When the General first assumed his post in October 2005, the militants thought he would be easy on them, explained Khan. However, from January to June 2006 he launched several operations and claimed over 400 militants were killed. The Army destroyed the opposition's ammunition dumps, and the enemy was in disarray.

¶5. (C) More recently, Khan rebuffed calls by the militants for negotiations. He emphasized that the militants were defying the law and there would be no negotiations unless they accepted the writ of the government. Khan imposed five non-negotiable demands before he would offer talks: 1) no cross-border attacks; 2) no harboring of foreigners, unless they were registered with the government; 3) no attacks on security or law enforcement personnel; 4) no parallel governments; and 5) those wanted by the Army should be turned over. (Note: these conditions reflect President Musharraf's own consistent policy. End note.)

¶6. (C) As a parallel track to the military strategy, Khan agreed with the Governor's plan to have a loya jirga (grand council) for the FATA, noting that no insurgency has ever been resolved by the use of force alone. There has to be political involvement, and the Army supports giving political talks a chance, while reserving military force as an option, when needed.

¶7. (C) Lastly, Khan called for better coordination and greater interaction with the Afghan National Army. He noted the improvement in cooperation and communications with Coalition

PESHAWAR 00000360 002 OF 002

Forces on the Afghan side, but felt there should be more flag-level and staff meetings between Pak-Afghan military authorities.

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Governor Orakzai  
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¶8. (C) Governor Orakzai expressed optimism about the current situation in the FATA, and the civilian authority's capacity to implement development projects. The key to winning the war on terrorism in the region is political, military and economic stability, and political authority was central to this plan. Like General Khan, Orakzai stated that peace in the FATA depended on a strong and stable Afghanistan. If either the Pakistani or Afghan side had a political, economic, or military vacuum, the other would suffer.

¶9. (SBU) The Governor agreed to send a team of engineers and doctors to Muzaffarabad, in Kashmir, to consult with an arriving team of U.S. Army specialists that would refresh the Pakistani military's understanding of the power sources of the MASH unit left behind after the end of the earthquake relief operations. The 84-bed hospital can be split in two, and has been offered to the NWFP government. The governor has not yet made a decision on where the hospitals will be located.

¶10. (C) The Governor told the Ambassador privately that he is continuing his preparations for a tribal jirga, but is not yet ready to convene it. He said that he was pleased with tribal reactions so far; the incidence of attacks against Pakistani forces has dropped significantly. As he had done with General Khan, the Ambassador stressed the criticality of effective Pakistani action to prevent cross-border attacks.

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Comment  
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¶11. (C) These meetings indicate potential conflicts between the 11th Corps Commander and the new Governor, as in the past. Orakzai plans to take the lead on FATA issues, but General Khan doubts the organizational capacity of the Governor's civilian institutions. As a result, General Khan will likely continue to seek to carve out a significant role for the Army in FATA development. While Governor Orakzai is rapidly trying to increase his capacity, he may need to cede some authority to the Army in executing FATA development programs in the near term.  
End comment.  
SPANGLER